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Inducfionless induction consists of using pure equational reasoning for proving the 
validity of an equation in the initial algebra of a set of equational axioms, which 
would normally require some kind of induction. Under given hypotheses, the 
equation is valid iff adding it to the set of axioms does not result in an inconsistency. 
This inconsistency can be found by the Knuth-Bendix completion algorithm, 
provided that the signature of the algebra is split into free constructors and defined 
symbols, which must be completely defined in terms of constructors This is the 
base of the so-called inductive completion algorithm of Huet and Hullot. TWO key 
concepts, inductive reducibility and inductive co-reducibility, allow us to extend these 
techniques in various directions: incomplete specifications, nonfree constructors, no 
constructors specified, equational term rewriting systems. The method is adapted 
for proving the consistency property of an enrichment of a specitication by new 
operators and new equations. In addition, we get also a simple algorithm to exhibit 
a set of constructors of a specification. Finally, inductive co-reducibility is reduced 
to inductive reducibility and an algorithm for deciding inductive reducibility is 
given for left linear term rewriting systems. ‘7 1989 Academic Press, Inc 
I. INTRODUCTION 
An equation t = t’ is said to be valid in a variety, i.e., a class of algebras 
that are models of a set A of equational axioms, iff t = t’ is true in all these 
models. It is well known that this is equivalent to checking whether t = t’ 
can be derived from the axioms A, by using instantiation and replacement 
of equals by equals as inference rules. This is written t = A t’, and = A is 
called the equational theory of A. 
When A can be compiled into a convergent term rewriting system R 
[25], i.e., it has both properties called (uniform) termination and 
Church-Rosser (equivalently confluence), then t = A t’ can be decided by 
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testing the normal forms of t and t’ for identity. Similar techniques apply to 
equational term rewriting system (R, E) [ 171, positive conditional 
equations [43, 20, 191, to many-sorted signatures [16, 121, and even 
order-sorted signatures [ 11). For simplicity of notations, we will assume 
that we have only one sort. 
Programming with equations considered as rewrite rules has generated a 
great deal of interest in the past few years, with [35], OBJ [8], PLUSS 
[9], and many others. In these frameworks, the model which one has in 
mind is the initial algebra defined by the set of equations. Now, validity 
cannot be decided by merely equational reasoning anymore: some kind 
of induction becomes necessary. Simple and efficient techniques for 
automatically proving inductive theorems are therefore crucial when 
writing specifications. 
Musser [32] first showed how to use equational reasoning to perform 
inductive proofs: the general idea is that the equation is valid in the initial 
algebra iff adding it to the set of axioms does not result in an inconsistency. 
Note that this technique does not only allow one to prove inductive 
theorems, but also permits one to check whether an enrichment of an 
abstract data type is protected (i.e., gives an isomorphic initial algebra). 
This technique was shown to be sound in several cases: 
- If the set of axioms contains the axiomatization of an equality 
predicate [32, lo]. 
- If the set of operators can be partitioned into free constructors C, 
and defined symbols D, such that every ground term with a defined symbol 
can be made equal to a ground term built upon the constructors only 
[ 15,231. This last property has been called sufficient completeness or com- 
pleteness of definitions and studied by several authors, including 
[44, 36, 4, 27, 31. 
Due to Huet and Hullot [lS], this second method can be made very 
efficient, since simple extensions of the Knuth and Bendix completion 
procedure can be designed to achieve the goal. However, the method has 
many limitations: 
- Completeness of definitions must be satisfied. 
- Constructors must be given and free. 
- Inductive properties expressed by nonorientable equations (e.g., 
commutativity) cannot be dealt with. 
- Conditional equations or rules are not permitted. 
Our goal in this paper is to show how to deal with specifications that do 
not satisfy these properties. Actually, the second restriction was already 
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partially relaxed by Paul [37], who assumed that the equational theory of 
the constructors was inductiueZy complete, a notion introduced by Tarski 
which means that the equational theory and the inductive theory coincide. 
In other words, every (inductive) theorem can be proved equationally. 
Unfortunately, inductive completeness is undecidable. Even more, no suf- 
ficient condition is known, except the trivial one: the case of free construc- 
tors is a particular case of inductive completeness. This work was then 
refined by Kirchner [23] who allowed hierarchies of specifications, with 
the assumption of inductive completeness made for each specification at a 
leaf of the hierarchy, and by Puel [39] who obtained similar results for 
proving properties in final algebras. 
Another direction was suggested by Remy in his thesis [42]; in Chap- 
ter 2’s introduction, he suggests, without a proof: 
Ajouter les assertions a la spkitication. Appliquer l’algorithme de completion a la 
specification augmentie. Si le resultat est un systtme de rtecriture canonique 
detinissant sur les termes primitifs les mCmes formes normales que le systeme 
primitif, les assertions sont valides dans l’algebre initiale. 
Pour que cette condition soit rtalisee. il suflit que les rtgles engendrees ne 
rtduisent pas les terms primitifs. 
However, R&my did not follows up this idea in the rest of his thesis, 
where the completeness of definitions of defined symbols with respect to 
constructors is assumed. On the other hand, the first one of these two 
statements had already been given and proved by Lankford [30], while the 
second was proved by Dershowitz [6]. But Lankford did not realize that 
the syntactic restrictions imposed by Huet and Hullot could be lifted, and 
Dershowitz was therefore the first to work the idea out. Starting from the 
very same ideas, a major new step is obtained in [18], where the 
knowledge of a set of constructors is not required but can be used to speed 
up the inductive completion process. Moreover, it is also shown how the 
method can be adapted to prove non-orientable equalities, like com- 
mutativity, which could not be proved before. These improvements will 
allow the use of these techniques in the middle of writing a specification, 
rather than when the specification is completely written, as this was the 
case when the assumption of sufficient completeness was needed. This 
makes the difference from the user viewpoint. 
The extension of these techniques to the case of conditional term 
rewriting systems is only alluded to in [IS], because of the lack of realistic 
completion procedures handling this case [20, 191. 
Regardless of their scope or practicability, all these methods are based 
on the same main paradigm: transform a proof by induction into a proof 
by consistency. For that reason, these methods have been called proofs 6~ 
consistency by Musser and Kapur in [33, 341, where the logical foun- 
dations of these methods are investigated. They have also been called 
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inductionless induction by Lankford [30] because no explicit induction 
scheme is given a priori. 
The present paper is an extended version of [ 181, with all results proved 
in detail. Section 2 gives the background on rewrite rules. Section 3 
introduces the basic concepts, inductive reducibility and inductive 
co-reducibility and gives their main properties with respect to induction. 
Inductive completion based on inductive reducibility and inductive 
co-reducibility is studied in Section 4. Section 5 studies’ how inductive 
reducibility relates to sufficient completeness, providing an algorithm for 
computing a set of constructors for a Church-Rosser specification and an 
improved inductive completion procedure. Section 6 deals with the 
problem of consistent enrichments. We show how to check this property 
with a minor modification of our inductive completion procedure. Finally, 
the problem of testing for inductive co-reducibility is reduced to the 
problem of testing inductive reducibility in Section 7. Then, the decidability 
of inductive reducibility is proved for left linear term rewriting systems, 
including the case of associative-commutative rewritings, A general but 
inefficient algorithm has recently been given by Plaisted [41], but does not 
handle associative-commutative rewritings in general: this case remains 
therefore open. A detailed proof of an improved version of Plaisted’s result 
have been given by Kapur, Narendran, and Zhang [21], but it does not 
incorporate the associative-commutative case. The case of (positive) con- 
ditional rewritings as in [20 or 191 has not been addressed yet, and we are 
unable to make any guess for that case. 
II. PRELIMINARIES 
Our notations are consistant with those in [16, 173. 
Given a set X of variables and a graded set F of function symbols, 
T(F, X) denotes the free algebra over X also called term algebra. Variables 
have arity 0 by convention. Elements of r(F, X) are called terms. The initial 
algebra will be denoted by T(F): its elements are ground terms, i.e., terms 
without variables. V(t) denotes the set of variables occurring in t. A term is 
linear iff variables of l’(t) have exactly one occurrence in t. We write t[t’] 
to indicate that t’ is a non-variable subterm of t. By removing t’, we get a 
term with a hole called a context and denoted t[ 1. t, t’, tl, . . . . 1, r, g, d, will 
denote terms. We will also use occurrences, i.e., sequences of natural 
numbers, to denote positions inside a term, and denote by o(t) the set of 
occurrences of a term t, and by GDom(t), the set of non-variable occurren- 
ces of t. We use the letter e for the empty sequence. If u is an occurrence in 
o(t), t/u denotes the subterm of t at occurrence U, and t[u +- t’] or simply 
t[t’] the term obtained by replacing t/u by t’ in t. 
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Substitutions s are endomorphisms of T(F, X) with a finite domain D(s). 
We denote by s(t) or simply st the application of the substitution s to the 
term t. s, s’, and s” will denote substitutions. Composition of substitutions s 
and s’ is denoted s’s. 
We call axiom or equation any pair (t, t’) of terms and write it t = t’. 
Given a set E of equations, the equational theory generated by E is the 
smallest equivalence relation denoted = E with the following properties: 
(i) for any equation g = d in E, g = Ed, 
(ii) for any substitution s, t = E t’*st = E st’ (closure by instan- 
tiation), 
(iii) for any context t[ 1, t’= E t”j t [t’] = E t[t”] (closure by 
context). 
= E is also called E-equality. 
= E can also be defined as the reflexive transitive closure of the following 
relation, called are step replacement of an equal by an equal: t I-I[u] t’ if 
t = t[sg] such that t/u = sg, t’ = t[sd] and either g = d or d= g belongs 
to E. 
If t’ = E st, (resp. s” = E ss’), we say that t’ (resp. s”) is an E-instance of t 
(resp. s’) and that s is an E-match from t to t’ (resp. s’ to s”). If E is empty, 
we simply speak of an instance and a match. 
An E-unifier of two terms t and t’ is a substitution s such that st = E St’. 
If E is empty, there exists a most general unifier, called mgu, for any pair of 
terms that has unifiers: all other unifiers of these two terms are actually 
instances of the mgu. If E is not empty, a basis for generating the set of 
unifiers by instantiation is called a complete set of unifiers. A complete 
unification algorithm computes such a basis for any two terms. It is finite if 
it computes a finite basis for every two terms. Such algorithms are known 
for many equational theories, ‘including commutativity, associativity and 
commutativity, see [22] for an elegant treatment of this problem. 
A rewrite rule is a pair of terms denoted l+ r such that V(r) is a subset 
of V(1). Given a set R of rewrite rules, we say that t rewrites to t’ denoted 
by t -+ R t’ or simply t + t’, iff t = t[sf] and t’ = t[sr] for some rule I -+ r in 
R and some substitution s. Given a set R of rules and a set E of equations, 
we say that t rewrites to t’ module E denoted by t + R,E t’ iff t = t[t”], 
t” = E sl and t’ = t[sr] for some rule I + r and substitution s. This rewrite 
relation using both rules and equations at the same time is due to Peterson 
and Stickel [40]. Note that E-equalities do not apply in the context t[ ] of 
the application of the rule. The case where this is permitted gives rise to 
another relation denoted by RfE: t -+ R/E t’ iff t = E t” and t” -+ R t’. Of 
course, the relation R is included (in a set theoretic sense) into the relation 
+R, E and this one is in turn included in the relation R/E. This will be 
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freely used in the following. Finally, we will denote by +RE any of these 
relations R, R, E, and R/E, when necessary. The reduction relation is the 
reflexive transitive closure of the rewrite relation. We will denote it by +* 
and by -+ + to indicate that there is at least on rewrite step. 
A set R of rules is said to be E-terminating (resp. terminating) if the 
relation R/E (resp. R) admits no infinite chain. This requires that 
V(g) = V(d) for each equation g = d in E, an assumption made in the 
following. An irreducible term is said to be in normal form. A normal form 
of t for the relation R/E (resp. R) is a term denoted t!R/E (resp. t!R) or 
simply t ! if no ambiguity, such that t + * R/E t ! (resp. t -+* R t !). 
Given a set A of axioms split into a set R of rules and a set E of 
equations, the RE-Church-Rosser property, i.e., t = A t’ iff t +* RE tl, 
t’ -+* RE t2 and tl = E t2, is decidable [17] provided R is E-terminating 
(i.e., R/E has no infinite chain) and E has a finite unification algorithm. 
R is said to be RE-convergent modulo E when it is both E-terminating 
and RE-Church-Rosser. We will also simply say that RE is convergent 
modulo E. 
Note also that RE-reducibility and R/E-reducibility coincide if R is 
RE-convergent modulo E, and that R/E is convergent modulo E if R is 
RE-convergent modulo E, see [ 171 for details. This will be freely used 
when necessary. All these notions specialize to an empty E, allowing us to 
drop the mention to E in this case. 
Given two rules I-+ r and /’ -+ r’ such that I= f[t] and t and I’ are 
E-unifiable with a complete set S of E-unifiers of t and 1’, then the set 
{ (sr, sl[sr’] ) 1 for any s in S} is a complete set of critical pairs of I-+ r with 
I’ -+ r’. Of course, such complete sets of critical pairs may be obtained for 
different subterms t of I, if they unify with 1’. Again, this notion specializes 
to an empty E. 
The concept of a critical pair is due to Knuth and Bendix [25] and is 
especially important in term rewriting theory: it allows us to transform a 
non-convergent (but terminating) set of rules into an equivalent (i.e., 
generating the same equational theory) convergent one by adding new 
rules obtained by orienting the critical pairs in such a way that the set of 
rules remains terminating. This is the basis of the so-called Knuth-Bendix 
completion procedure. 
III. INDUCTION AND INDUCTIVE REDUCIBILITY 
Some results in this section are a particular case of results in the next 
section. On the other hand, they show where and why each particular 
hypothesis is needed, Moreover, they can be generalized to a more abstract 
setting, as very recently done by Toyama [45]. 
First, we introduce the basic concept of our method: 
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DEFINITION 1. Given a reduction relation, a term t is inductively 
reducible iff all its ground instances are reducible. 
This definition is very general. The reduction relation can be any, defined 
for example by a set RO of rules, as in the first part of this section, or by a 
mixed set of rules and equations, as in the second part of this same section. 
EXAMPLE 1. Given a Peano-like specification of integers modulo 2, with 
operators S, (Successor) and 0 (Zero), and equation S(S(0)) -+ 0, then 
S(S(x)) is inductively reducible, but S(x) is not; clearly, S(0) is an 
irreducible instance of S(x), whereas any ground instance of S(S(x)) 
contains the subterm S(S(O)), hence is reducible. 
Inductive reducibility appeared first in [26] with the name of quasi- 
reductibilite and [28] with the name of quasi-reducibility. It was first 
invented to decide sufficient completeness in the presence of relations 
among constructors. Actually, inductive reducibility was also the underly- 
ing concept in [6], but its main role in inductive completion, as shown 
here, was first clearly pointed out in [26, 181 under the name of quasi- 
reducibility. 
The key to our method is the following property of inductive 
reducibility: 
LEMMA 1. LetRObeasetofrulesandR=ROv{l-+r},whereI+risa 
rule such that I is inductively reducible by RO. Then, a ground term t is in 
normal form for R iff it is in normal form for RO. 
Proof Assume t is reducible by R, then it is either reducible by a rule of 
RO or by the rule I+ r. In the latter case, since t is ground, a subterm of t is 
a ground instance of Z, therefore is reducible by a rule of RO. Thus in both 
cases, t is reducible by RO. 
This result does not imply that any RO-normal form of t is also an 
R-normal form. However, this becomes true if R is convergent, but we will 
not need it. 
Since rules whose left-hand sides are inductively reducible do not change 
normal forms of ground terms, they can be added safely, as shown now: 
THEOREM 1. Let RO be a set of rules, and 14 r a rule such that 1 is induc- 
tively reducible by RO. Assume now that R = RO u (l- r) is convergent. 
Then I= r is an inductive theorem of RO. 
Proof For any ground substitution s, sl= R sr, hence sl! R = sr! R by 
convergence hypothesis of R. Since sl! R and sr! R must be ground, we 
obtain sl! RO = sl! RO by applying Lemma 1, hence sl= RO sr. 
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In words, inductive reducibility ensures that no normal form becomes 
reducible. But, this is not enough for I= r to be an inductive theorem, 
because two different normal forms could be made equal by being the 
normal forms of a same term once the rule I -+ r is added. This is avoided 
by the Church-Rosser (or convergence) property. Hence, the combination 
of both properties is needed. 
EXAMPLE 2. An easy proof of the inductive property S(S(x))=x for 
integers modulo S(S(0)) can now be given as follows: 
(1) Orient the equation into the rule S(S(x)) -+ x. 
(2) Verify that S(S(x)) is inductively reducible. 
(3) Add the rule to the starting rule S(S(0)) + 0, and verify that the 
resulting set of rules { S(S(0)) --+ 0, S(S(x)) + x} is convergent. 
Although it is assumed, termination is not really used in these results: 
what is important is the existence of a normal form for any term. 
Termination is actually a sufficient condition for this property to hold. This 
remark is the basis of a recent work by Toyama [45]. 
Also, convergence for all terms is not needed either: what is necessary is 
convergence on the set of ground terms. This remark is the basis of two 
other recent works by Fribourg [7] and Kuchlin [29]. 
Let us now give a sort of converse of Theorem 1: 
THEOREM 2. Let RO be a convergent set of‘ rules, and I-+ r a rule such 
that 1 is not inductively reducible by RO. Assume now that R = RO v { I+ r} 
is terminating. Then I= r is not an inductive theorem of RO. 
Proof Since 1 is not inductively reducible by RO, there exists some 
ground substitution s such that sl! RO = sl. Hence, sl! RO -+ R sr -+ * R sr! RO, 
since R contains RO. 
Assume now that I= r is an inductive consequence of RO. Then sl= sr is 
an equational consequence of RO, and since RO is convergent, sl! RO = 
sr! RO. As a consequence, R is not terminating, which is a contradiction. 
Again, confluence of RO is not really needed here, the existence and 
unicity of normal forms would suffice. Moreover, termination of 
RO u {l-+ r > is not needed either: the property used is that t is different 
from t’ if t rewrites to t’ in at least one step, i.e., the rewriting relation is 
acyclic. 
These results carry over to the case of mixed sets of rules and equations, 
used to include such axioms as commutativity, which cannot be oriented 
into rules without losing the termination property. As we have seen in the 
preliminaries section, there are several possible rewrite relations when both 
rules and equations are dealt with at the same time. R/E and R, E are two 
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possible ones, but there are many others. In the rest of this section, we will 
always use the relation R/E. 
Starting from a set RO of rules, and a set Eo of equations, we now want 
to prove new rules I+ Y and new equations g= d. For simplicity, we 
assume that we have only one new rule and one new equations. In order to 
generalize the previous proofs, we need several analogs of Lemma 1. 
First, an easy generalization of Lemma 1: 
LEMMA 2. Let RO be a set of rules, EO be a set of equations, and assume 
that I+ r is a rule such that 1 is inductively reducible by ROIEO. Then a 
ground term t is in normal-form for ROjEO iff it is in normal-form for 
ROW {l+r}/EO. 
In order to add equations, we need a new notion, closely related to 
inductive reducibility, but dealing with pairs of terms: 
DEFINITION 2. Given a reduction relation RE and a congruence 
relation = JZO, a pair (g, d) of terms is inductively co-reducible iff for every 
ground substitution s, sg (resp. sd) is in normal form iff sd (resp. sg) is in 
normal form and sg = EO sd. 
Again, this definition is very general, and we will use it now with ROjEO 
for the reduction relation RE. 
There is a strong link between inductive reducibility and inductive co- 
reducibility, namely: the pair (g, d) is inductively co-reducible if both g and 
d are inductively reducible (there is no ground s such that sg and sd are in 
normal form). Moreover, the pair (g, d) is not inductively co-reducible if g 
(or d) is inductively reducible and the other one is not. So, inductive 
reducibility can be used to decide most cases of inductive co-reducibility. 
For a general method for testing inductive co-reducibility, see Section 7. 
We can now state the analog of Lemma 1 for equations: 
LEMMA 3. Let RO be a set of rules, EO be a set of equations, and assume 
that g = d is an equations such that the pair (g, d) is inductively co-reducible 
by ROjEO. Then a ground term t is in normal form for ROIEO iff it is in 
normal form for ROIEO u {g = d}. 
Proof: Assume that a ground term t is reducible by RO/EOu {g= d}: 
there exists a term t’ such that t = EO u {g = d} t’ and a subterm of t’ is an 
instance of a left-hand side of a rule in RO. Now, either t = Eo t’, and t is 
reducible by RO/EO, or t=EOtl = (g=d} t2=,5’Qu {g=d} t’, and a sub- 
term of tl is an instance of g or d. Since for any equation in EtJ we have 
V(g) = V(d), tl must be ground. Hence, tl contains a subterm which is a 
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ground instance sg of g. Now, either sg is reducible by ROIEO, and t is also 
reducible by RO/EO, or it is irreducible and sg = EO sd. Hence, t = ,%I tl = 
E’O t2 = EO u {g = d} t’, and we conclude the proof by induction on the 
number of application of the axiom g = d in the proof from t to t’. 
The lemma does not hold for Peterson and Stickel’s rewrite relation, 
since the rewriting cannot be lifted from sg to t. The same happens for 
Lemma 2. On the other hand, this is all what we need in the following. 
Lemma 3 is not enough for handling equations, hence: 
LEMMA 4. Let RO be a set of rules, EO be a set of equations, and assume 
that g = d is an equation such that the pair (g, d) is inductively co-reducible 
by RO/EO. Assume that t and t’ are two ground terms in normal form for 
RO/EO. Then t=EOu {g=dJ t’ i f f  t=EO t'. 
Proof The if part is trivial. For the only if part, assume that t = 
Eo u {g = d } t’. If t = EO t’, then we are done. Otherwise, t’ = Eo tl 
= {g=d} t2=EOu {g=d} t’. Now tl and t2 must be ground, by 
assumption on the equations, and the hypothesis that t and t’ are ground. 
Moreover, tl must be in normal form, because t is in normal-form. Since tl 
contains a ground instance sg of g, sg must be in normal form, hence 
sg=Eosd, and t =lXl t2 = EOu { g=d) t’. We conclude the proof by 
induction on the number of applications of the axiom g = d in the proof 
from t to t’. 
We can now get the analog of Theorem 1: 
THEOREM 3. Let RO be a set of rules and EO a set of equations. Assume 
that I-+ r is a rule and g = d is an equation such that 1 is inductively reducible 
by ROIL% and the pair (g, d) is inductively co-reducible by RO/EO. Assume 
now that ROu {l+r}/EOu (g=d} IS a so 1 convergent. Then I= r and g = d 
are inductive theorems of RO u EO. 
Proof For any ground substitution s, sl!RO/EO = RO u { I+ r} u EO u 
{ g = d} sr! RO/EO. Applying Lemmas 2 and 3, and the convergence 
hypothesis of the rewrite relation yields sl! RO/EO = Eo u ( g = d} sr! 
RO/BI. From Lemma 4, we now get sl! RO/EO = Eo sr! RO/EO. Therefore, 
sl= RO u Eo sr. The proof is exactly the same for the equation g = d. 
In practice, we can of course use a rewrite relation different from RO/EO 
if we know that RO is convergent modulo Eo, which is usually the case. 
EXAMPLE 3. The well known (small) Fermat’s theorem in N/3: 




x* (y+z)+x* y+x*z,x+x+.u~o) 
1= r is x * x * x = x, and produces the rule x * x * x --) x. The rewrite 
relation uses pattern matching modulo associativity and commutativity of 
+ and *: this is correct since the starting specification is convergent for this 
rewrite relation. x * x * x is clearly inductively reducible for this rewrite 
relation, since * is completely defined in terms of 0, 1, and +. Since the 
whole term rewriting system is still convergent, x * x * x = I is an inductive 
theorem of the natural numbers modulo 3. 
Two other cases of Fermat’s theorem have been tested; the simplest one, 
the natural numbers modulo 2, has been tested with the distributed version 
of REVE 11241. The case of natural numbers modulo 5, has been tested 
with sbREVE, a faster implementation developed from the previous one by 
Hsiang and Mzali [46]. 
EXAMPLE 4, Again a definition of integers, with operators 0, S, and +: 
RO=(x+O+x,x+S(y)+S(x)+y}, 
and I= r is x + y = y + x. The rewrite relation uses commutative pattern 
matching also, i.e., it is Peterson and Stickel’s rewrite relation. Both x + y 
and y + x are inductively reducible, because + is completely defined in 
terms of 0 and S, hence (x + y, y + x) is inductively co-reducible. Again, 
the whole rewriting system is still convergent, hence x + y =y + x is an 
inductive theorem. 
All these examples are actually based upon inductive reducibility. Let us 
now give an example where inductive co-reducibility is fully needed: 
EXAMPLE 5. The following specification of integers with 0, 1, and + : 
RO={~~+O+.Y,O+~~~}, HI= {x+(y+z)=(x+y)+z}, 
g=dis x+ y= y+z. We can prove that the pair (x+ y, y+x) is induc- 
tively co-reducible by RO/EO: this is true for any ground substitution s such 
that s(x) or s(y) contains 0 as a subterm. Otherwise, sg and sd are both in 
normal form and equal modulo associativity. Now, RO is easily checked to 
be convergent modulo associativity and commutativity, therefore com- 
mutativity is an inductive property of the specification. 
As previously, we can also disprove rules: 
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THEOREM 4. Let RO be a set of rules and EO a set of equations such that 
RO/EO is convergent module EO. Assume that I + r is a rule such that 1 is not 
inductively reducible by ROIL%. Assume now that RO v {I + r)lEO is also 
terminating. Then I= r is not an inductive theorem of RO v EO. 
ProoJ Similar to the proof of Theorem 2. 
Let us now disprove equations: 
THEOREM 5. Let RO be a set of rules and EO a set of equations such that 
RO/EO is convergent modulo EO. Assume that g = d is an equation such that 
the pair (g, d) is not inductively co-reducible by ROIL33 Assume also that 
RO/Bl u {g = d } is terminating. Then g = d is not an inductive theorem of 
ROvEO. 
Proof: Since the pair (g, d) is not inductively co-reducible, there must 
exist a substitution s such that: 
either sg and sd are both irreducible, and sg # Eo sd, 
or sg is irreducible and sd is reducible (or the converse), hence sg = sg! 
and sd + + ROjEO sd!, therefore sd -+ + RO/EO v {g = d} sd!. 
Assume now that g = d is an inductive consequence of RO u Eo. Then, 
sg = RO u EO sd, and since RO/JXl is convergent, sg! = EO sd!, which con- 
tradicts the first previous case. To contradict the second one, we note that 
sd! = Eo sg! = sg = { g = d } sd. As a consequence, ROIEO u {g = d } cannot 
be terminating. 
Of course, the same remarks as previously about ground confluence and 
termination of RO/EO and RO u { 1 -+ r}/EO u {g = d > also apply here. 
Finally, these results can be extended to the case of conditional 
equational term rewriting systems, having a convergence property as 
defined in [43,20, or 191. They can also be presented in a more abstract 
setting as done in [45]. This is left as an interesting exercise for the reader. 
IV. COMPLETION 
In many situations, the resulting set of rules is not convergent, thus it 
must be completed by a completion procedure. We show that inductive 
proofs can be performed in that case, provided that the previous checks are 
applied to all critical pairs, once they are oriented. 
Our goal now is to extend the previous results to inductive completion 
procedures. This was actually suggested in [42] and sketched in [6], 
although the procedure was not formally given. Following [17], we give 
here a recursive definition of these procedures. In all these procedures, > 
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stands for a reduction ordering, see [S], E for the set of equations, R for 
the current set of rules and P for the current set of pairs (the candidates for 
becoming new rules) 
We first deal with the simple case of rules without equations. We assume 
that a whole set PO of equations is given, and that we want to prove that 
all of them are inductive consequences of RO. 
Ind-compl(R0. PO, > };;initial call, with rules in RO all marked 
PROCEDURE Ind-compl(R, P, > ). 
CASE P is not empty THEN 
Choose a pair (p, q) in P and remove it from P; 
Compute p! and q!, the R-normal forms of p and q; 
CASE p! = q! THEN Ind-compl(R, P, > ) 
p!>q! THEN Itp! and r-q! 
q! >p! THEN It q! and r tp! 
ELSE STOP and RETURN Failure 
ENDCASE; 
;; Comment: I must be defined when CASE is exited. 
IF / is not inductively reducible by RO THEN STOP and RETURN Disproof 
ENDIF; 
(P, R) = Simplification( P, R, I --t r) 
Ind-compl(RLi{l-+r}, P, >) 
all rules in R are marked THEN STOP and RETURN Proof 
ELSE choose an unmarked rule I -+ r in R with respect to fairness hypothesis; 
(P, R) = Critical-Pairs (I + r, R, P) 
Mark rule I + r 
Ind-compl( R, P, > ) 
ENDCASE 
END Procedure 
Note that we check inductive reducibility by RO and not by R. This is 
important for reason of efficiency (see Section VII). Note also the comment 
about the definition of 1: this results from the fact that Ind-compl works by 
side effects and stops as soon as proof, disproof, or failure is encountered. 
The purpose of the Simplification procedure is to keep the set of rewrite 
rules in a reduced form. Therefore, right-hand sides are reduced by the 
added rule l+ r, while rules whose left-hand side is reducible are dropped 
to P, since their orientation may change. The Critical-pairs procedure com- 
putes critical pairs of the rule 1 + r with the other rules of R. Of course, we 
can imagine other ways of computing the critical pairs, for example, one at 
a time. Since we do not need the details of these procedures, we invite the 
interested reader to consult [14]. 
Now, the first main result: 
THEOREM 6. Assume that RO is Church-Rosser and that Ind-compl does 
not return Failure. Then equations in PO are inductive consequences of RO, iff 
Ind-compl returns Proof or runs forever. 
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The proof of this theorem is based on the fact that ground terms are in 
normal form for RO iff they stay in normal form all along the completion 
process. 
Let R* be the (maybe infinite) convergent set of rules returned by the 
algorithm. 
LEMMA 5. A ground term t is reducible by R* ijjf it is reducible by RO. 
Proof Assume that a ground term t is reducible by RO, therefore 
t + RO t’, and t > t’ for the reduction ordering used in the completion 
procedure. Since = RO is contained into = R*, we have t = R* t’, hence t 
and t’ reduce by R* to a same term t”. Now, t must be different from t”, 
otherwise t’ -+* t, hence t’= t or t’ > t, which is impossible. Therefore t is 
reducible by R*. 
Conversely, assume that t is reducible by R*. Then, either it is reducible 
by a rule of RO, or it is reducible by a rule I+ r added during the com- 
pletion process. In the latter case, a subterm of t is a ground instance of f, 
therefore is reducible by a rule of RO, since 1 is inductively reducible by RO. 
In both cases, t is reducible by RO. 
Note that this proof does not depend upon a particular completion 
procedure, it only uses two basic facts: first, the set of rules returned by the 
procedure is convergent, even if infinite. This is usually called the com- 
pleteness property of the completion procedure. Second, the left-hand side 
of each added rule is checked for inductive reducibility by the starting set 
of rules. 
Proof of the Theorem. Assume first that Ind-compl does not return 
Failure or Disproof. Then, R* is a Church-Rosser set of rules and defines 
the same equational theory as RO u PO. Let I = r be an equation in PO, and 
sl and sr be ground instances of I and r with respectively, normal forms sl! 
and sr! for RO. Since I= r is provable from R* (since it is from RO u PO), 
sf! =sr! is provable from R* also. Since R* is Church-Rosser, sl! and sr! 
must have the same normal forms in R*. Applying now Lemma 5, we get 
sf ! = sr!. Hence, sl= RO sr and I= r is an inductive consequence of RO. 
Conversely, let us assume that Ind-compl returns Disproof at some recur- 
sive call, and let R be the current set of rules when Disproof is returned. 
Then, some rule I + r was generated from a pair in P such that 1 was not 
inductively reducible by RO. Hence, some ground instance sl is irreducible 
by RO, i.e., sl! = sl -+ R sr -+ * RO sr!, hence sl! > sr!. Assume now that all 
equations in PO are inductive consequences of RO. Since I = r is an 
equational consequence of RO u PO, it must be an inductive consequence of 
RO. Therefore sl! = RO sr!. Since RO is convergent, necessarily, sl! = sr! and 
we get a contradiction. 
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The proof shows precisely where the assumption that RO is convergent is 
necessary: it is for returning Disproof when a left-hand side is not induc- 
tively reducible by RO. A different proof of the same result is given in [6]. 
The previous results carry over to equational term rewriting systems, as 
we show now. We assume that the completion procedure designed in [ 171 
is used. Now, terms are reduced modulo the equations. As already noticed, 
different reduction relations may be used, and the most usual one is 
Peterson and Stickel’s rewrite relation [40]. 
Since we can handle rules and equations, we may prove rules and 
equations as well. In the following procedure, both are done at the same 
time. We denote by RO and Eo the starting sets of rules and equations, with 
the assumptions that RO is convergent modulo Eo. E contains all equations 
of LO, plus the new non-orientable equations to be proved. PO is the set of 
rules to be proved. As usual, we will restrict ourselves to the case where the 
set of equations, i.e., E, remains the same all along the completion process. 
Eo of course, will not change either. The ordering > is a quasi-reduction- 
ordering whose associated equivalence contains = E. We assume that I > r 
for every rule in RO. This must be checked beforehand. 
CASE (g, d) for some g = d in E- ED is not inductively co-reducible by RO modulo Eo 
THEN RETURN Disproof 
ELSE RETURN Ind-E-compl (RO, Eo, E. PO, > } ;;Initial call, with rules in RO all marked. 
PROCEDURE Ind-E-compl (R, ED, E, P, > ). 
CASE P is not empty THEN 
Choose a pair (p, q) in P and remove it from P; 
Compute p! and q!, the R-normal forms modulo E of p and q; 
CASE p! = Eq! THEN Ind-E-compl( R, Eo, E, P, > ) 
p! > q! THEN / + p! and r + q! 
q!>p! THEN I+q! and rtp! 
ELSE STOP and RETURN Failure 
ENDCASE; 
IF I is not inductively reducible by RO modulo Eo 
THEN STOP and RETURN Disproof 
ENDIF; 
(P, R) = E-Simplification(P, R, E, I+ r) 
R = Ind-E-compl(R u {I -+ r}, 60, E, P, > ) 
all rules in R are marked THEN STOP and RETURN Proof 
ELSE choose an unmarked rule I+ r in R with respect to fairness hypothesis; 
(P. R) = E-Critical-pairs (/ + r. R. E) 
Mark rule I -+ r; 
Ind-compl(R, ED, E, P, > ) 
ENDCASE 
END Procedure 
Procedure E-Simplification and E-Critical-pairs are much more complex 
than in the standard case. In particular, E-Critical-pairs computes complete 
sets of critical pairs. All detail of these procedures can be found in [ 171. 
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THEOREM 7. Assume that RO is Church-Rosser modulo Eo and that 
Ind-E-compl does not return Failure, Then equations in E-E0 and in PO are 
inductive consequences of RO v EO, iff Ind-E-compl returns Proof or runs 
forever. 
Again we need to prove that the set of ground terms in normal form 
does not change during the completion: 
LEMMA 6. A ground term t is reducible by ROIL% iff it is reducible 
by R*IE. 
Proof Assume that a ground term t is reducible by RO/EO, therefore 
t + ROIEO t’, and t’ is ground by assumption on the equations. Now, 
t Z/E t’, otherwise t = Eo t’ by Lemma 4, and RO/EO would not be ter- 
minating. Hence, t --+ RO/E t’, and t > t’. Since = RO u Eo is contained into 
= R* v E, we have t = R* v E t’, hence t and t’ reduce by R*IE to a same 
term t”. Now, t must be different from t”, otherwise t’= E t, or t’> t, which 
is impossible. Therefore t is reducible by R*/E. 
Conversely, assume t is reducible by R*IE. Then, t = E t’ and t’ is 
ground and reducible by a rule of R*. Now, t = EO t’ by Lemma 4, and we 
again have two cases: either t’ is reducible by a rule of RO, and we are 
done, or it is reducible by a rule I + r added during the completion process. 
In the latter case, a subterm of t’ is a ground instance of I modulo Eo, 
therefore is reducible modulo Eo by a rule of RO, since 1 is inductively 
reducible by RO modulo Eo. In both cases, t is reducible by RO/EO. 
Proof of the Theorem. Assume first that Ind-compl does not return 
Failure or Disproof. Then, R* is a Church-Rosser set of rules and R* u E 
defines the same equational theory as RO u E u PO. Let I = r be a rule of PO 
or an equation of E - Eo. Let now sl and sr be ground instances of 1 and r 
with, respectively, normal forms sl! and sr! for RO/EO, or equivalently for 
RO modulo Eo, since RO is convergent modulo Eo. Of course sf! 
= RO u E u PO sr!, hence sl! = R* u E sr!. Applying Lemma 6, sl! and sr! 
are also in normal form for R*/E or equivalently for R* modulo E, since 
R* is convergent modulo E. Hence, sl! = E sr!, and applying Lemma 4, sl! 
= JXI sr!. As a consequence, sl= RO u Eo sr and I= r is an inductive 
consequence of RO v EO. 
Conversely, let us assume that Ind-compl returns Disproof at some recur- 
sive call, and let R be the current set of rules when Disproof is returned. 
Then, two cases may happen. Either the pair (g, d) is not inductively 
co-reducible by RO modulo Eo for some equation g = d in E - Eo, or some 
rule I-+ r was generated from a pair in P such that 1 was not inductively 
reducible by RO modulo Eo. In the first case, we can directly apply 
Theorem 5 and conclude that this particular equation is not an inductive 
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consequence of RO u EO. In the second case, some ground instance sl is 
irreducible by RO modulo Eo, i.e., sl! = sl+ RIDI sr + RO/EO ST!, hence 
sl! > sr!. 
Assume now that all equations and rules in E - EO and PO are inductive 
consequences of RO u LB. Since I = r is an equational consequence of 
RO u PO u E, it must be an inductive consequence of RO u EO. Therefore 
sl! = RO u EO sr!. Since RO/EO is confluent, necessarily, sl! = Eo sr!. Con- 
tradiction. 
EXAMPLE 6 [23]. Integers with predecessor (P) and unary minus 
C-1: 
RO = { S(P(x)) -ax, P(S(x)) --) x, 
o+Y~Y,s(x)+Y~~(x+y),~(x)+y~P(x+y), 




Let us prove the following inductive theorems: 
PO={(x+y)*z=(x*z)+(y*z)and(-x)*y= -(x*y)}. 






and the algorithm returns proof, all left-hand sides being inductively 
reducible. Starting again with RO and EO and trying to prove the equation 
x * x=x generates the following set of rules: 
x*x-+x 
S(S(S(W)))) -+ S(w))) 
and the algorithm returns disproof, since S(S(S(S(0)))) is not inductively 
reducible by RO modulo Eo. 
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It is clear from the previous proofs and results that this technique is very 
general and can be applied each time a completion procedure is known to 
have the completeness property. Such a claim has been made in [6]. Com- 
pletion procedures have recently been given for conditional term rewriting 
systems [ 19,201. They can therefore be adapted to perform inductive 
proofs. However, these procedures are fairly complex and slow, and fail in 
most practical cases. Since we do not expect any breakthrough in this area 
to happen in a near future, we do not expand on this. 
V. A CONSTRUCTIVE DEFINITION OF CONSTRUCTORS 
In this section, we will show how inductive reducibility provides a quite 
natural way of exhibiting the constructors. Then, we will use this argument 
to show that the completion algorithm in [ 151 is a particular case of ours. 
Let us first link explicitly completeness and inductive reducibility: 
THEOREM 7. Assume R is convergent and the signature is split into a set 
C of constructors and a set D of defined symbols. Assume also that the 
normal form of a ground constructor term is a,ground constructor term. Then 
f is in D zff f(x1, . . . . xn) is inductively reducible by R. 
Proof Assume f is in D. Let f(tl), . . . . tn) be a ground instance of 
f(x1, . . . . xn), which is equal to a ground constructor term t’ in normal form. 
Since R is Church-Rosser, t’ is the normal form of f(t1, . . . . tn), and since t’ 
is a constructor term, the two terms must be different. Hence, f(t1, . . . . tn) is 
reducible. 
The converse is proved by noetherian induction on +R. Assume t is a 
ground non-constructor term. Then t must contain a ground subterm of 
the form f(t1, . . . . tn), which is thus reducible to t’ by hypothesis. Hence 
t + t[t’], The result follows now by applying the induction hypothesis 
to t[t’]. 
This is a general way of deciding if a symbol f is completely defined in 
terms of constructors, provided that we are able to decide inductive 
reducibility, see last section. Note also that the condition that ground 
constructor terms have ground constructor terms as normal forms can be 
easily enforced by a usual syntactical mean: if a left member of a rule is 
built with constructors only, so must the right-hand side. 
This result also suggests a constructive definition of what a constructor 
is, whose advantage is to meet our intuition that constructors are those 
operators used to build normal forms of ground terms: 
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DEFINITION 3. A function f of arity n is a dejinedfunclion iff f(x1, . . . . xn) 
is inductively reducible by R. Otherwise, it is a constructor. 
Let us now use our definition of constructors to improve our inductive 
completion algorithm. First, we compute C and D, following our definition. 
Now, note that a non-constructor term is inductively reducible, but a con- 
structor one may not be. This means that we only have to check inductive 
reducibility in the latter case. Finally, notice that critical pairs may be 
broken into pieces each time a free constructor is on top. Accordingly, we 
may improve our algorithm by replacing the processing of pairs by the 
following sequence: 
CASE p! = q! THEN Ind-compl( R, P. > ) 
p! = c(p1, . . . . pn) and q! = c(q1, . . . . qn) and c is a free constructor 
THEN Ind-compl(R, Pu {(pl, ql), . . . . (pn, qH)}. >) 
p! z q! THEN I+p! and r t q! 
q!>p! THEN /+-q! and rtp! 
ELSE STOP and RETURN Failure 
ENDCASE; 
IF 1 is a constructor term and not inductively reducible by R 
THEN STOP and RETURN Disproof 
ENDIF; 
Of course, this implies that the free constructors are known. Now our 
algorithm reduces exactly to that of [15] when constructors are free and 
other symbols are completely defined in terms of constructors. On the 
other hand, non-free constructors usually satisfy well-known equational 
theories (commutative, associative and commutative, sets, multisets, . ..). 
Each one of these usual theories owns particular decomposition schemas, 
i.e., an equation c(p1, . . . . pn) = c(q1, . . . . qn), where c is a constructor of this 
theory, can be simplified to a disjunction of sets of equations among the pi 
and the qi. For example, if + is commutative, pi + p2 = ql + q2 is 
equivalent to pl = ql and p2 = q2, or pl = q2 and p2 = ql. Such decom- 
position schemas have been studied for the purpose of unification in [22] 
and could be reused in our case to speed up the process of inductive proofs. 
Finally, this result and definition again carry over easily to more com- 
plex computation models, i.e., equational and/or conditional term rewriting 
systems. 
VI. CONSISTENT ENRICHMENTS 
The problem of checking an enrichment of a base specification for 
consistency with respect to the base, i.e., the enrichment does not collapse 
terms in the starting initial algebra, is generally presented in the literature 
as being equivalent to that of validity. This is true if enrichment means 
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adding new equations, but no new symbols, the latter case being more 
complex as shown by the following example: 
EXAMPLE 7. The base specification has symbols S and 0 with the set of 
rules RO = (S(S(0)) + 0}, and is enriched with a new symbol P and rule 
P(x) + S(x). 
Now, this enrichment is of course consistent (no two normal forms on 0 
and S are made equal in the new algebra) and the resulting set of rules 
{w(0)) -+ 0, P(x)+ w4) . IS convergent, but P(x) was not inductively 
reducible by RO. On the other hand, the enrichment would not have been 
consistent if P had been included in the base specification! This shows that 
inductive reducibility must not be checked systematically when new sym- 
bols are added in the enriched specification. Here is the solution: replace 
the processing of critical pairs in Ind-compl by the following, where a basic 
term is a term built up from the starting set of symbols: 
CASE p! = q! THEN Ind-compl(R, P, n, > ) 
p! = c(p1, . . . . pn) and q! = c(q1, . . . . qn) and c is a free constructor 
THEN Ind-compl(R, Pu {(pl, ql), .._, (pn, qn)}, n, > ) 
p!>q! THEN I-p! and rtq! 
q! > p! THEN I+ q! and r + p! 
ELSE STOP and RETURN Failure 
ENDCASE; 
IF I and r are basic terms and I is not inductively reducible by R 
THEN STOP and RETURN Disproof ENDIF; 
IF 1 is a basic term and r is not a basic term 
THEN STOP and RETURN Failure ENDIF; 
Note that we have a new Failure case here, when I is a basic term and r 
is not: nothing can be said in that case. In practice, this means that the 
ordering does not orient the pair (p, q) the right way. 
Now, the result expressing the correctness of our algorithm: 
THEOREM 8. Let us call TFO(X) the term algebra constructed on the base 
specification (whose elements are called basic terms), and TF(X) the 
enriched term algebra. Let RO be the convergent set of rules of the base 
specification, and PO the added set of equations (to be oriented) of the 
enriched specification. Then the enriched specification is consistent with 
respect to the base lff the algorithm returns Proof or runs forever. 
As previously, the proof first needs a lemma showing that ground basic 
terms stay in normal form during the completion process: 
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LEMMA 1. A ground basic term t is reducible by R* ijjf it is reducible 
by RO. 
Proof The first part of the prood is as usual. 
Conversely, assume that a ground basic term t is reducible by R*. Then, 
either it is reducible by a rule of RO, or it is reducible by a rule I + r added 
during the completion process. In the latter case, I must be a basic term, 
therefore is inductively reducible by RO. Since a subterm of t is a ground 
instance of 1, t is reducible by RO. 
Proof of the Theorem. Assume first that Ind-compl does not return 
Failure or Disproof. Then, R* is a Church-Rosser set of rules and defines 
the same equational theory as RO u PO. Let t and t’ be two basic ground 
terms and assume that t = RO u PO t’. Then t!R* = t’! R*, hence t! RO = 
t’! RO by Lemma 7. 
Conversely, let us assume that Ind-compl returns Disproof at some recur- 
sive call and let R be the current set of rules when Disproof is returned. 
Then, some rule I+ r was generated from a pair in P such that 1 and r are 
basic terms and I is not inductively reducible by RO. Hence, some ground 
basic instance sl is irreducible by RO, i.e., sl! = sl-+ sr + * RO sr !, hence 
sl! > sr!, where sl! and sr! denote the respective normal forms of sl and sr 
for RO. Since > is a reduction ordering, we have sl! =si>sr>sr!. Thus 
sl! =/sr!. 
Assume now that the enriched specification is consistent with respect 
to the base. Since I = r is an equational consequence of RO u PO, 
sZ= RO u PO sr. By consistency property, since I and r are both basic terms, 
we have sl= RO sr, therefore sl! = RO sr!. Since RO is convergent, 
necessarily, sl! = sr!. Contradiction. 
Assume now that we want to add the new rule S(x) + P(x), instead of 
the previous one P(x) -+ S(x). Of course, the resulting specification is still 
consistent, but our result does not apply any more. What happens in that 
case is that ground normal forms do change, and our proof method does 
not apply. However, we feel that similar techniques should still apply to 
some restricted cases (it does not in general). This is a research problem for 
future work. Again, these results carry over to equational term rewriting 
systems: in case a non-orientable equation is added, either both sides must 
be basic terms (and then inductive co-reducibility must be satisfied), or 
both must contain new symbols. The case where one side contains a new 
symbol, and the other side does not is a failure case, as previously. 
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VII. TESTING FOR INDUCTIVE REDUCIBILITY 
AND INDUCTIVE CO-REDUCIBILITY 
Inductive reducibility has recently been shown to be decidable by 
Plaisted [41]. His algorithm works by exhibiting a test set, i.e., a finite set 
S of irreducible substitutions, such that a term t is inductively reductible iff 
all its instances by substitutions in S are reducible. The set S is the set of all 
irreducible ground substitutions of depth smaller than D, where D is a con- 
stant depending on the set of rules, and the depth of a term is the length of 
the longest branch of t considered as a tree. Unfortunately, D is a super 
exponential number in the size of the left-hand sides of rules, hence it is 
extremely large, even for very simple examples as shown later. Our goal 
here is to describe an improved algorithm, based on a much smaller test 
set. Let us first address the problem of inductive co-reducibility and show 
how it can be decided by using a theorem from Kapur, Narendran, and 
Zhang [21], which uses a similar number D’, but strictly smaller than D: 
THEOREM [21]. Let t be a term and s be a substitution such that s(t) is 
irreducible by R. Let x be a variable occuring in t. If depth(s(x)) > D’, then 
there exists a smaller substitution s’ such that Is’(x)] < Is(x)], s’(y) = s( y) if 
y # x, and s’(t) is irreducible modulo R. Furthermore, s’(t) can be obtained 
from s(x) by the replacement of a subterm with another. 
Let (g, d) be the pair to be tested, R = (Ii -+ ri) be the set of rules, and 
# be a new function symbol. Let now C(t) be the set of all contexts 
obtained from t, i.e., for any c[ ] in C(t), there exists a non-variable sub- 
term t’ of t such that t = c[t’]. 
We now define the set of rules Rgd associated to the pair (g, d): Rgd = 
( #(cg[li], cd[lj]) + #(cg[ri], cd[rj])lfor any cg[ ] in C(g), any cd[ ] 
in C(d), and any Ii -+ ri and Ij -+ rj in R}. 
THEOREM 9. Given a reduction relation RE and a congruence = EO, the 
pair (g, d) is inductively co-reducible off every instance of #(g, d) by an 
irreducible substitution of depth smaller than D’ is reducible by Rgdw 
{ # (4 xl -+ x}. 
Proof: (g, d) is inductively co-reducible by R, iff for every ground 
instance s, either sg and sd are both reducible, or sg and sd are both 
irreducible and equal modulo EB. Clearly, we can restrict our attention to 
irreducible ground substitutions, and using the previous theorem, to 
irreducible ground substitutions of depth smaller than D’. We are left to 
show that having the desired property for such substitutions s, is the same 
as s( # (g, d)) being reducible by Rgd u { # (x, x) + x}: the rule # (x, x) --* x 
forces sg and sd to be equal modulo Et3 when both of them are irreducible, 
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while the rules from Rgd force sg and sd to be both reducible at the same 
time. 
Inductive co-reducibility, as inductive reducibility, is therefore decidable. 
Unfortunately, the constant D’ in the theorem by Kapur et al. is extremely 
large. Hence, Plaisted’s method for checking inductive reducibility or the 
previous one for checking inductive co-reducibility cannot be really 
applied. 
Let us now describe a more efficient algorithm for testing inductive 
reducibility. Unfortunately, our method handles only the case of left linear 
term rewriting systems. Similar to Plaisted’s one, our algorithm works by 
exhibiting a test set, i.e., a finite set S of substitutions, such that a term t is 
inductively reducible iff all its instances by substitutions in S are reducible. 
The main idea used to construct S is that left-hand sides of rules have a 
finite depth, hence we are only interested in the top of ground substitutions 
in normal form. 
Let d=depth(R) be the maximal depth of the left-hand sides of rules 
in R. 
DEFINITION 4 [36,41]. The top of a term at depth i is a term such 
that: 
top( t, i) = t if depth(t) 6 i, otherwise 
top(g(tl, . . . . tn), 0) = g(x1, . . . . xn), for xl, . . . . xn being distinct new 
variables, 
top(g(t1, . . . . tn), i)= g(top(t1, i- l), . . . . top(tn, i- 1)). 
Note that t is an instance of top(t, i) for any non-negative integer i. 
EXAMPLE 8. top(g(h(a, b), c), 1) = g(h(xl,x2), c) and top(g(h(a, 6), c), 2) 
= gv44 61, c). 
Let now S(R) be the (finite) set {top(t, d)(for any ground term t in 
normal form). We assume in the following that if t and t’ are two different 
terms of S(R), then V(t) and V(t’) have an empty intersection, which can 
always be the case by appropriate renaming. 
Before showing that the definition of S(R) is effective, let us show how to 
use it for testing inductive reducibility: 
THEOREM 10. A term t is inductively reducible by a left-linear term 
rewriting system R iff all its instances obtained by substituting terms of S( R) 
to its variables are reducible by R. 
Proof: Assume first that t is inductively reducible by R, and let s(t) be 
an instance of t such that for any xi in t, s(xi) = ti is a term of S(R). Let ti’, 
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a ground irreducible instance of ti, such that top(ti’, d) = ti, and let s’ be 
the substitution such that s’(xi) = ti’. Since t is inductively reducible, there 
must exist some occurrence u of GDom(t) (because s’ is in normal form), 
and some rule I+ r in R such that s’( t)/u is an instance of I. 
First let u be an occurrence of GDom(l): s(t)(m) =s’(t)(uu) = l(u), 
because each ti is the top of the corresponding ti’. Now let W be the set of 
variable occurrences of 1, and s” the substitution such that for any w  in W 
such that Z(w) =x, then s”(x) =s(~)/uw. Notice that s” is well defined, 
because R is left linear, so x cannot have several occurrences. It follows 
that s( t)/u = s”(l), hence s(t) is reducible. 
Conversely, let s’(t) be a ground instance of t. Ifs’ is not in normal form, 
then we are done. Otherwise, let s(xi) = ti = top(s’(xi), d) for each variable 
xi of t. By hypothesis, s(t) must be reducible. But s’(t) is an instance of s(t) 
by definition of s(xi), and the result follows. 
The previous theorem tells us how to check inductive reducibility, 
provided S(R) is given. We are thus left to prove that S(R) can really be 
computed in finite time. This is done now: 
THEOREM 11. Let Si = { top( t, d) If or any irreducible ground term t such 
that depth(t) < i} Assume R is left linear. Then, S(R) = Sk as soon as Sk = 
Sk + 1 for some integer k. 
Proof Since S(R) is the limit of the Sk when k becomes infinite, we 
prove by induction on i, that Si= Sk for any i greater or equal to k. 
Assume that Si= Si+ 1, and let us prove that Si + 2 = Si. Let Ti = 
(W4 m)lf or a ny ground irreducible term t of depth i}. 
Assume first that Ti + 1 is empty, hence all terms of depth greater or 
equal to i + 1 are reducible, thus Ti + 2 is empty and the result is true. 
Otherwise, let I in Ti + 2, and g(t1, . . . . tn) an irreducible ground sub- 
stitution instance of t, with depth i + 2. Each ti is an irreducible ground 
term of depth at most i + 1. By induction hypothesis, there exist irreducible 
ground terms tl’, . . . . tn’ of depth at most i, such that top(ti, d) = top(ti’, d). 
Assume now that the ground term g(tl’, . . . . tn’) is reducible. Since each one 
of the ti’ is irreducible, g(tl’, . . . . tn’) = s’(l), for some rule I+ r of R and 
some substitution s’. Let first u be an occurrence of 1, then 
g( tl ‘, . . . . m’)(u) = g(t1, . . . . tn)(u), because rules are of depth at most d. Let 
now W be the set of variable occurrences of Z, and s be the substitution 
such that s(x) = g(t1, . . . . tn)/w, if Z(w) = x. Since rules in R are left linear, s 
is well defined. Now, g(t1, . . . . tn) = s(l) which contradicts the irreducibility 
of g(t1, . . . . tn), therefore g(tl’, . . . . tn’) was irreducible. To conclude the 
proof, we note that top( g(t1, . . . . tn), d) = top( g(tl’, . . . . tn’), d). 
Since S(R) is finite, there must be such a k, hence this result permits 
computing S(R). 
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EXAMPLE 9. A specification of linear lists of integers, nil is the empty 
list, U makes a unit list from an integer, append is denoted by a dot, and 
integers are given by 0 and S. We have the following rules: 
RO = { ni1.Z -+ 1, U(?c).nil + U(x), (U(x)./l).12) -+ U(X).(Zl.Z2)). 
In order to prove that “.” is associative, we must check whether the term 
(11.12).[3 is inductively reducible. With our method, we construct S(R) = 
nil 
W), U(wJ)), U(S(S(x))L 
W).W), U(O).U(S(x)L U(O).(W).U(Y)), W).(U(x).(ll.~2)) 
US(x)).W), U(S(X)).U(S(Y)L U(S(x)).(KY).W))7 
u(s(x)).(u(Y).(,l.r2)). 
This makes 13 terms in S(R); therefore by instantiating (L/2).12 in all 
possible ways, we get a test set of 13 ** 3 terms, where ** denotes the 
power function. 
The proof of the above result assumes rules of R to be left linear, which 
is not the case for Plaisted’s proof [41]. However, although his algorithm 
is based on a similar idea of using a test set, it is super-exponential: for the 
previous example, the test set obtained by using Plaisted’s method would 
contain 7 * 4 * * (( 10 * * 10) * 2 + 2) terms. This number has actually been 
computed by using Kapur-Narendran-Zhang’s bound D’, Plaisted’s one 
being even larger. 
Similar results do not hold in general for the Peterson and Stickel’s 
rewrite relations modulo equations: although Theorem 11 remains valid, 
Theorem 10 does not! What happens is that a ground instance of a term t, 
using an irreducible substitution s, may be reducible by R, E although the 
instance of t by the top of s may be irreducible. This is so, because the 
proof that s(t) is E-equal to a term with an instance of some left member of 
rule as a subterm, may not hold anymore when using the top of s, if the 
proof goes down inside the non-top part of s. To overcome this problem, 
we consider equational theories E with a commutation property, that will 
enable us to lift the E-equality proof from S(I) to top(s)(t). 
DEFINITION 5. A set of axioms E is top-commuting iff t = Et’ implies 
tl-[[e] . ..j-I[e] t” I-I[u~].~.I-([uP] t’for some t”, with vi#e for any iin 
[l . ..p]. 
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We now extend the top-communication property to sets of occurrences. 
A set D of occurrences is said to be prefix-closed if whenever an occurrence 
u = VW is in D, then the occurrence v itself is in D. 
LEMMA 8. Assume E is top-commuting. Then, for any prefix-closed set D 
of occurrences in both D(t) and D(t’), t = E t’ implies tl-[[ul] ... 
I-I[un] t”l-I[vl] ... /-[[up] t’for some t”, with ui in Dfor any i in [l . ..n] 
and vi outside of D for any i in [ 1 ... p]. 
Proof By induction on the size of D. By hypothesis, t = Et’ implies 
t I-I[e] . ..I-I[e] t”l-I[vl] ... I-l[up] t’ for some t”, with uife for any iin 
[l . ..p]. Hence, t”=f(tl”, . . . . tm”), t’=f(tl’,..., tm’), and tj”=Etj’ for 
any j in [ 1 ... m]. Let Dj= {v I jv is in D}. By induction hypothesis, 
tjl-I[u’l] . ..I-I[u’n’] t”l-l[v’l] . ..I-I[u’p’] t’ for some t”, with u’i in Di 
foranyiin [l . . . n’] and v’i outside of Di for any i in [ 1 . . . p’]. The result 
now follows by first putting all these equality steps together, then applying 
commutation between equality steps on distinct subterms in order to have 
equality steps in D applying first. 
This lemma enables us to prove our lifting property, with top(t), the top 
of a term t, equal to top(t, d), where d is now equal to depth(R) + 
depth(E) - 1. 
LEMMA 9 (top-lifting). Assume E is top-commuting and R is left linear. 
Then t = Es(l) implies top(t) = Es’(l) for some substitution s’. 
Proof: Using the previous lemma, t/-l [ul] . . (-I [un] t” I-1 [vl] ... 
(-1 [up] s(1) for some t”, with ui in D for any i in [ 1 ... n] and vi outside of 
D for any i in [ 1 ... p]. It follows that t”(u) = l(u) for any u in D(1) and 
since 1 is left linear, t” is an instance of 1, i.e., t” = s”(1) for some sub- 
stitution s”. Now, since equalities in E are of depth smaller or equal to 
d-depth(R)+ 1, we have top(t) I-[[ul] ... I-[[un] top(t”), with ui in D for 
any i in [l + . . n]. As a consequence, top(t) = E top( t”) = top(s”)(l), which 
proves our result with s’ = top(Y). 
As a consequence of this lemma, Theorem 10 remains valid. Theorem 11 
also remains valid and our decidability result for inductive reducibility 
remains true for the rewrite relation R, E provided E is a top-commuting 
equational theory. Now, we give sufficient conditions for a set of axioms to 
be top-commuting. 
DEFINITION 6. E is focally top-commuting iff t I-[[u] tl I-I[e] t’ with 
u # e, implies t (-1 [e] t2 1-I [vl] .. . I-1 [up] t’ for some t2, with vi # e for 
any i in [l . ..p]. 
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LEMMA 11. E is top-commuting if it is locally top-commuting. 
Proof. By induction on the number of top-applications (at occur- 
rence e) of an axiom of E in the E-equality proof of two terms. 
As usual for local properties, top-communication can be decided on 
suitable critical pairs: 
DEFINITION 7. Assume I= r and g = d are two equations such that g 
and r/u, u # e, are unifiable by most general unifier S. Then 
(s( 1), s(r [ u c d ] ) ) is a top-commutation critical pair. 
LEMMA 12. Assume E is linear, i.e., a member of any equation is linear. 
Then E is locally top-commuting $,f all its top-commutation critical pairs 
satisfy the top commutation property. 
Proof. Similar to other critical pair lemmas. 
Lemmas 11 and 12 remain valid with the following variation of the 
top-communication property: 
DEFINITION 8. E is locally top-commuting iff t I-[[u] tl I-[[e] t’ with 
u #e, implies t 1-I [e] ... 1-l [e] t2 )-I [u] t’ for some t2, with u # e. 
The proof of this version of Lemma 11 works by induction on non-top 
applications of an axiom of E. 
These results clearly apply to the commutative axiom, since it has no 
top-commutation critical pairs. But many other theories of interest do not 
have this property, for example, associativity and commutativity or right 
commutativity. However, this property is defined on the presentation of the 
theory, rather than on the theory itself. Hence, we may find another presen- 
tation that has the property. This can be done by using a completion 
process, in a way much like the Knuth and Bendix completion procedure. 
Unfortunately, this does not solve the case of associativity and com- 
mutativity, since infinitely many rules are generated by the completion 
process, and the depth of the generated term rewriting system is therefore 
infinite! To overcome this problem, we will use flattened terms and show 
that a finite set of flattened tops can be found. This will be done in two 
stages. First, we exhibit an infinite set of flattened tops, with a nonbounded 
width. Using a simple argument (the width of the rules is bounded), we will 
then restrict the set of tops to a finite set. 
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DEFINITION 9. Flat(r), for a term t, is the normal form of t for the 
convergent term rewriting system 
f(x1, . ..) *up - 1, f( yl, ..,) yq), xp + 1, . . . . xn) 
+f(xl, . . . . XP- 1, J’l, . ..) yq, xp+ 1, . ..) xn) 
for any integers p, q, and n such that p is in [ 1 . ..n]. and for any AC 
operator J 
The fact that this term rewriting system is convergent is well known: it is 
obviously terminating and confluent, since all critical pairs are convergent. 
The use of flattened terms is based on the following easy properties, whose 
proof is left to the reader: 
LEMMA 13. 
t=ACt’ iff Flat(t) = PFlat( t’) 
and 
t = AC s(l) iff Flat(r) = PFlat(Flat(s)(Flat(l))), 
where = P is the permutative congruence on subterms of associative- 
commutative symbols. t, t’, 1 and s are terms for substitutions which can be 
partly flattened already. 
These properties allow us to reason at the level of flattened terms only. 
More precisely, the rewrite relation on terms has the property: 
t + R/AC t’ iff Flat(t/u) = P Flat(Flat(s)(Flat(Z))) for some occurrence u 
and rule I+ r and Flat(t’) = PFlat(t[u +- Flat(Flat(s)(Flat(r)))]). 
Note that this relation rewrites in AC-congruence classes (hence t’ is 
defined up to = AC) but has the same normal forms as R, AC (the Peterson 
and Stickel rewrite relation), since the set of rules is supposed to be 
Church-Rosser modulo AC. 
We may now define the top of a term as the top of its flattened version 
and keep for S(R) the same definition as previously, defining depth(R) as 
the maximal depth of the flattened versions of the left-hand sides of rules. 
Of course, we may have infinitely many terms in S(R), since an 
associative-commutative symbol may now have a unbounded number of 
subterms. 
We now easily.prove that Theorem 10 remains valid: this is a consequence 
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of both Lemma 13, and the top-communication property of = P (its 
axioms have depth one, therefore they have no top-commuting critical 
pairs). However, this does not lead to a decision procedure, because tops in 
S(R) are infinitely many. We therefore need to restrict the set of tops. Let k 
be the maximal number of subterms of an AC-operator in the left members 
of the flattened rules. We keep in S(R) those tops only whose AC-operators 
have no more subterms than k + 1. Let S-AC(R) be this new set of tops. 
THEOREM 12. A term t is inductively reducible by a left linear term 
rewriting system R module AC iff all its instances obtained by substituting 
terms of S- AC(R) to its variables are reducible by R, AC (at non variable 
occurrences oft by the definition of tops). 
Proof After the previous discussion, we only need to prove that 
replacing S(R) by S- AC(R) does not affect Theorem 10. This is done by 
showing that for each substitution s with terms in S(R) such that s(t) is 
reducible, there exists a substitution s’ with terms in S - AC(R) such that 
s’(t) is reducible. If s(t) is reducible, then Flat(s(t/u)) = PFlat(s(1)) for 
some occurrence u and rule I-+ r such that V(l) and V(t) are two disjoint 
sets of variables. We now use the fact that 1 has finitely many subterms to 
exhibit some s’ in S-AC(R) such that Flat(s’(t/u)) = PFlat(s’(1)). Let us 
assume that some AC-symbol f at occurrence v of Flat(s(t/u)) has more 
subterms than in the left members of rules. Then, there must exist a 
variable x at some integer occurrence i of Flat (@)-actually Flat(l/v’), if 
v’ corresponds to v in the proof Flat (s( t/u)) = P Flat (s(l))-which collects 
all superfluous subterms. Since s(t) is reducible at occurrence U, these sub- 
terms must be part of the substitution s, and their father node in ns(t) must 
be labelled by f: s’ can now be constructed by eliminating all of them 
except k + 1, thanks to Lemma 14. 
For the sake of simplicity, we have assumed that there was only one such 
variable x, but there could be, of course, several ones without altering the 
arguments in the proof. To end the proof: 
LEMMA 14. Assume Flat(t) is an irreducible term. Then so is Flat(t’), 
where t’ is obtained from t by deleting any number of subterms except at 
least k + 1 of them, where k is the maximal number of subterms in a left 
member of rule, that have a common father node labelled by an AC symbol. 
Proof An easy use of Lemma 13. The number k + 1, and not k, comes 
from the fact that the k subterm in the rule could be ground. In that case, 
an additional subterm is needed to prevent the application of such a rule. 
This does not happen if there is a variable under the AC symbol in the rule. 
We thus have described an algorithm for testing inductive reducibility, 
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even in the presence of associative-commutative axioms or commutative 
axioms. This algorithm is more efficient than Plaisted’s one, the bound on 
the depth of the substitutions in the test set being a linear function of the 
set of rules, rather than an exponential one. It remains as a challenging 
open question to find a reasonable algorithm for the general case, for both 
inductive reducibility and inductive co-reducibility. Moreover, none of the 
previous algorithms extends to the case of the many sorted specifications. 
This issue should also be addressed in the future. Recent work by Comon 
[3] should permit us to solve these problems. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
We have presented here a very simple method to construct automatic 
proofs by structural induction. Our method is the natural extension of 
Huet and Hullot’s method to the cases mentioned at the beginning: 
- proofs of rules and equations as well, 
- arbitrary mixtures of rules and equations (provided we can run a 
completion algorithm) including non free constructors, 
- non-constructor symbols must not be completely defined in terms of 
constructors, 
- ability of computing automatically the set of constructors, 
- possibility of checking enrichments of data types for consistency. 
The method has an inherent limitation, however: the requirement of 
using a completion procedure. This means, for instance, that we deal with 
terminating sets of rules. While this requirement is natural for recursive 
definitions in data types, it may be hard to enforce in some occasions. 
Recent work in this area [13] should allow us to solve this problem. 
Another limitation is the possibility of divergence of completion. This can 
usually be avoided by using appropriate meta-rules. Another alternative 
opened by a recent work of Fribourg [7], allows using a weaker notion of 
completion, which permits us to avoid divergence in many practical cases. 
This has been recently exploited by Kuchlin [29]. 
Let us also point out that some work would be needed to design 
reasonable procedures for deciding inductive reducibility in the general 
case. 
Finally, we think that this method can be extended to Horn clause 
calculi. A first easy possibility is to extend the work of Paul [38], by 
replacing his requirement of sufficient completeness by an inductive 
reducibility check. On the other hand, Paul’s method manipulates explicitly 
the equality predicate, which is exactly what Huet and’ Hullot’s method 
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allows us to avoid. Some research is still needed here to improve over 
Paul’s method and include the ideas developed in this paper. 
We feel that these methods, in the long run, will challenge successfully 
the alternative method of [2]. In particular, we think that all results in a 
recent paper by Bergstra and Klop [l] should be proved by using our 
method, or better, by Kuchlin’s version of our method. We have not 
succeeded yet, since our current implementation is not complete and far 
too slow, but attempts to prove a few of them by hand have succeeded. 
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